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Abstract
This thesis examines how the IMO 2020 low-sulphur regulation has affected drybulk
shipping. Firstly, we examine which routes scrubber vessels sail compared to what
maritime economic theory would suggest. Secondly, we determine if scrubber vessels
increase speeds compared to non-scrubber vessels after IMO 2020. Thirdly, we analyze
whether scrubber vessels are less likely to be used for short-term time charter fixtures
(trip charter) than voyage charter fixtures. Lastly, we examine if IMO 2020 has caused
scrubber vessels to trade at lower $/tonne rates relative to non-scrubber vessels.
We use the difference-in-differences methodology to estimate the effects of the policy
change on the Capesize fleet. We include two-way fixed effects to control for both
time differences and vessel heterogeneity. 30,806 individual voyages and 120,047 weekly
speed observations are calculated from 36,767,462 Automatic Identification System (AIS)
positions in 2019-2020. Further, 1,016 individual fixture contracts are extracted from
Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network to analyze the effects on the freight market.
We find that scrubber vessels sail on longer voyages than non-scrubber vessels. However,
the difference in voyage distance does not increase between the two groups as a result
of IMO 2020. Our analysis further suggests that the difference in speeds increases for
scrubber vessels compared to non-scrubber vessels after IMO 2020. In addition, scrubber
vessels are less likely to be offered on a trip charter than a voyage charter after IMO 2020.
Lastly, our results indicate that scrubber vessels on average trade at similar $/tonne rates
as non-scrubber vessels, suggesting that shipowners investing in scrubbers are gaining the
potential savings from the lower fuel costs.
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1 Introduction
The shipping industry accounts for approximately 12% of the global sulphur oxide (SOx)
emissions (GEF-UNDP-IMO GloMEEP Project and IMarEST, 2018). Exposure to SOx
has damaging effects on both human health and the environment (Ackermann et al.,
1999). Therefore, on January 1. 2020, the UN International Maritime Organization
(IMO) introduced a new regulation named IMO 2020 to reduce the ship-to-air emissions
of sulphur oxide, by restricting sulphur contents in marine fuels from 3.5% to 0.5%.
Shipowners can comply with the regulation in two ways. First, by installing a scrubber
cleaning system, the exhaust is cleaned post-combustion to meet the emission requirements.
The second option is changing fuel type from heavy fuel oil (HFO) to low sulphur fuel oil
(VLSFO) with sulphur contents below 0.5%. The two options create a trade-off between
investing in a cleaning system and keeping the marginal costs at the current level versus
changing to the more expensive bunker type, resulting in increased marginal costs.
In this thesis, we study the impacts of IMO 2020 by its effect on the choice of either
installing a scrubber or switching to VLSFO on a variety of micro-market behaviors in
the drybulk market. As Capesize vessels are the largest drybulk carriers operating on
intercontinental voyages, the Capesize fleet is a substantial polluter of SOx emissions.
The contribution of the paper is fourfold. Firstly, we explore if scrubber fitted vessels,
hereafter called “scrubber vessels”, sail on longer voyages compared to non-scrubber vessels
after IMO 2020. Secondly, we analyze if the regulation has affected vessel speeds for the
two groups. Thirdly, we examine if scrubber vessels are less likely to be used for time
charter fixtures. Lastly, we investigate if scrubber vessels trade at a lower voyage charter
spot rate on specific routes after IMO 2020.
As the capital, operating and cargo handling costs increase disproportionate to the cargo
capacity, the unit cost of transport generally falls when the vessel size increases (Stopford,
2009). The economies of scale make Capesize vessels preferred on the long-haul routes
as their $/tonne costs are lower than for the smaller vessels. In addition, the average
fuel cost for a bulk carrier is estimated to account for 60-70% of the total voyage costs
(Stopford, 2009; Rehmatulla and Smith, 2015). Due to port time being relatively fixed
(Clarksons Research, 2021c), the result of scrubber installation and reduced fuel costs
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would suggest that scrubber vessels sail on longer voyages. Hence, spending more time
at sea and taking advantage of the lower fuel costs. Braemer ACM Shipbroking (2021)
identifies that the average voyage duration is approximately 14% longer for scrubber
vessels than non-scrubber vessels in 2020. However, our results do not indicate that
scrubber vessels sail on the longer routes after IMO 2020.
Ronen (1982) argues that the optimal vessel speed depends on the ratio of freight rate and
fuel price. In times of low freight rates and high fuel prices, slow steaming has become
a widely adopted practice to reduce fuel costs (Lee et al., 2015). IMO 2020 imposes an
increase in fuel costs for non-scrubber vessels, suggesting that the sailing speeds between
the two groups could differ. When studying the effects of stricter sulphur requirements in
the North Sea, Adland et al. (2017a) find no reduction in vessel speeds within Emission
Control Areas (ECAs). However, our results indicate that scrubber vessels increase speeds
compared to non-scrubber vessels after IMO 2020.
Shipowners have the flexibility to offer their vessels on either voyage charter contracts
or time charter contracts. The shipowner is responsible for all costs on a voyage charter,
and freight rates are paid per tonne of cargo transported. Conversely, a trip charter is
fixed on a time charter basis, paid per day for the period determined by the voyage and
specific cargo, where the charterer pays for voyage costs such as fuel (Stopford, 2009).
Interestingly, scrubber vessels conducted 143 voyage charter contracts and only ten trip
charter contracts after the implementation of IMO 2020 (Clarksons Research, 2021c).
Therefore, the shipowner’s choice of charter type does not seem randomly selected and
should be analyzed further.
Previous research has thoroughly investigated market failures such as the principal-
agent problem in the time charter market, where the shipowner invests in the energy-
efficient technology and the savings in fuel expenditure accrue to the charterer (Agnolucci
et al., 2014; Adland et al., 2017b; Longarela-Ares et al., 2020). Our results suggest that
shipowners are less likely to offer their scrubber vessels on trip charter contracts after IMO
2020. It is essential to clarify that scrubber installation is not an investment in energy
efficiency per se as all vessels need to reduce emissions. However, it illustrates that the
shipowner’s incentives for investing in a scrubber change depending on the contract type.
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The spot freight market is established by negotiations between shipowners and charterers,
where the freight price reflects the balance of ships and cargoes available (Stopford, 2009).
Adland et al. (2016) argue that the freight market consists of several micro-markets as
only the ships able to reach laycan can bid for a voyage contract. Traditionally, the
marginal vessel is a non-scrubber vessel. However, after IMO 2020, the marginal ship
could either be a scrubber or non-scrubber vessel. Consequently, if scrubber vessels cluster
on similar routes, the freight rate formation can potentially decrease to the marginal cost
of a scrubber vessel, which is lower due to their reduced fuel costs. Our results suggest
that scrubber vessels do not trade at a different rate than non-scrubber vessels after IMO
2020, indicating the shipowners offering their vessels on voyage charter contracts accrue
the potential fuel cost savings.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section two presents a literature
review covering theory and empirical testing of vessel speed optimization, principal-
agent theory and freight rate formation theory. Further, section three presents the data
foundation. Then, in section four, we present the empirical strategy. Thereafter, we
present and discuss the results in section five before finally rounding off with concluding
remarks in section six.
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2 Literature Review
The bulk spot freight market is described by Norman (1979) as a textbook example of a
perfectly competitive market, where the $/tonne freight rate is determined by the marginal
cost of the marginal vessel required to meet the demand for transportation. The market
of the cargo transported, international seaborne trade and the world economic activity
determine the demand side (Stopford, 2009). The supply-side depends on the fleet size,
the available tonnage of the fleet, newbuilding of vessels, bunker prices, scrapping rate
and the fleet’s operational efficiency at any given time (Strandenes, 1983; Beenstock and
Vergottis, 1989).
A perfectly competitive market depends on six conditions (Colander, 2012); (1) both buyers
and sellers are price takers, (2) the number of firms is large, (3) there are no barriers to
entry, (4) firms’ products are identical, (5) there is complete information about the market
and (6) selling firms are profit-maximizing entities. The drybulk market meets these
conditions on a macro level. A fleet of several thousand vessels operated by hundreds of
different owners are competing for the same transportation service. Shipbrokers assist both
the buying and selling sides and create a transparent market with efficiently distributed
information (Strandenes, 2000). Financing of vessels is generally available, and both ships
and their owning companies can move their operation to light regulatory- and low tax
regimes (Adland et al., 2016).
The research on freight rate formation is separated by a macro and micro perspective.
The first wave of freight market research in drybulk shipping focused on the interaction of
supply and demand on a macro-level (Tinbergen, 1959; Norman, 1979; Wergeland, 1981;
Charemza and Gronicki, 1981; Strandenes, 1986; Evans, 1994). Later studies use stochastic
modeling to forecast freight rate formation. Both time series models (Kavussanos and
Alizadeh, 2001; Kavussanos, 1996) and univariate continuous-time models (Bjerksund
and Ekern, 1995; Adland, 2006) solely consider historical and current spot freight rate
information. These models disregard market information such as the age profile of the fleet
and the size of the order book entirely. Lastly, studies combine the previous frameworks
by modeling the supply and demand of transportation as stochastic processes within a
dynamic equilibrium setting. Adland and Strandenes (2007) develops a freight market
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equilibrium model that incorporates a time-varying shape of the supply curve from
microeconomic analysis of vessel-specific characteristics of the fleet.
The recent focus on micro-level analysis on determinants of freight rates using individual
contracts considers the heterogeneity of geographical regions and vessel specifications.
Tamvakis and Thanopoulou (2000) investigate if there exists an age-premium in the
drybulk freight market and find no significant difference between freight rates paid
for newer versus older vessels. Alizadeh and Talley (2011) expand the research on
microeconomic determinants of drybulk spot freight rates to include the lead time (time
between contracting date and the earliest date for loading) and macroeconomic proxies
representing the market conditions, such as the Baltic Capesize Index (BCI) and its rolling
one-month standard deviation as a measure of volatility. Adland et al. (2016) propose
a model for freight rate formation in individual contracts incorporating charterer and
owner heterogeneity and owner-charterer match effects. Although market conditions and
routes remain the most influential covariates, they conclude that fixed effects related to
the identity of the charterer and owner-charterer match are significant contributors to the
Capesize spot freight rate.
Adland et al. (2017c) discuss the potential circularity problem and flaw of including a
macro freight index derived from micro data as a control variable for freight rate formation
on individual contracts. Their results suggest that using BCI as a control variable on
fixture data analysis substantially affects the vessel’s estimated coefficients and contract-
specific factors. Furthermore, they claim this circularity potentially causes an endogeneity
problem in the estimated regressions. As a counter to the circularity problem, they develop
a methodology for deriving objective market indices from micro-level fixture data.
Ship operators should adjust speeds to maximize profits (Strandenes, 1983). The traditional
speed optimization theory is anchored in the model proposed by Ronen (1982). Based
on the cubic law, he illustrates that speed is a function of the square root of the ratio
between the freight rate and fuel price. Further, Beenstock and Vergottis (1989) are the
first to empirically test Ronen’s theory finding a positive correlation between the freight
rate and fuel price ratio and speeds in the tanker market. Research by Devanney (2010)
later finds that vessels in the voyage and time charter market face the same optimization
problem, as charterers can re-offer a vessel on time charter to the spot market.
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The availability of micro-level positional vessel data through the Automated Identification
System (AIS) has made it easier to empirically test traditional economic theories on
speed optimization. Aßmann et al. (2015) find evidence that supports the theory by
Ronen (1982), but to a lesser extent and primarily regarding the ballast leg. Contrary,
Adland and Jia (2016, 2018) conclude that shipowners do not adjust vessel speeds based
on freight market conditions and the level of fuel prices. They suggest that speeds
are mainly determined by factors outside their models, such as weather conditions and
contractual constraints on both charter parties and port policies. Adland et al. (2017a)
find that the stricter sulphur regulations in the North Sea did not affect vessel speeds
once macro-factors were considered. However, they acknowledge that external factors
such as weather conditions and charter party clauses limit the ability of the shipowner
to optimize speeds on the laden lag. Adland et al. (2020) later question the correctness
of the cubic relationship assumption put forward by Ronen (1982) if actual speed differs
substantially from the vessel design speed.
There exists an extensive amount of research on market failure and principal-agent
problems regarding investments in energy efficiency. The principal-agent problem refers
to the observation that the economic benefits of energy conservation do not accrue to
the person who is trying to conserve (Golove and Eto, 1996). The time charter market
in drybulk shipping represents such a market. A shipowner can invest in energy-efficient
vessels, but any savings in fuel expenditures accrue to the charterer. Agnolucci et al.
(2014) investigate if there exists a rate premium for fuel efficiency in the Panamax time
charter market and find that on average, only 40% of financial savings delivered by energy
efficiency accrue to the shipowner for the period 2008-2012. Adland et al. (2017b) expand
this study to several vessel sizes and a more extended sample period to include an entire
market cycle. They find that only 14-27% of fuel cost savings are reflected in a higher
rate during normal market conditions. However, in poor market conditions, they find that
inefficient energy vessels attract a premium.
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3 Description of Data
This section presents the different data sources and the descriptive statistics. We utilize
data on Capesize vessels from 2019-2020 to study multiple effects of the IMO 2020
regulation on the drybulk market. Clarksons Research (2021b) categorizes Capesize
vessels as bulk ships ranging from 100,000 deadweight tonnes (DWT). In addition, Very




IMO requires the use of AIS to increase the safety and security of the maritime industry,
improve regulations and monitor ship traffic (Lee et al., 2019). Therefore, all vessels from
300 gross tonnage on international voyages must be equipped with an AIS transponder
(IMO, 2021). The AIS transponders send out information on vessel identity (IMO number),
position, speed and course using Very High Frequency (VHF) radio waves. In addition,
AIS data can be exchanged with nearby vessels, satellites and AIS base stations. Each
AIS component is explained in detail in appendix A1.
We have been granted AIS data by Vesseltracker GmbH, containing information on
drybulk vessels in 2019-2020. This dataset originates from two datasets of different AIS
reporting frequencies, with a shorter time difference between each observation in January
2019 to August 2019 compared to August 2019 to December 2020. This is discussed
closer in appendix A2.3. We extract information on vessel location, corresponding speed,
and draught level for each vessel from the AIS data. We combine the dataset with
Clarksons World Fleet Register (WFR) using the IMO number to include vessel-specific
characteristics such as age, size and scrubber information.
3.1.2 Signal Ocean Voyage Data
We have been granted access to voyage data on The Signal Ocean Platform by The
Signal Group. This dataset contains voyage information on the laden and ballast legs
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for Capesize vessels in the sample period. The voyage data consists of the IMO number
and route information based on AIS data, including port, regions and time for loading
and discharging of cargo. We use the Signal Ocean voyage dataset to establish a starting
port (area) and an ending port (area) for each voyage with the corresponding starting
and ending time. This allows us to establish the start- and endpoints for each trip in the
AIS data.
3.1.3 Fixture Data
The fixture data is extracted from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network (SIN) and
consists of both voyage and trip charter contracts for Capesize vessels in 2019-2020. The
main difference between these two contract types is the allocation of voyage expenses,
particularly the fuel cost, between the owner and charterer. The IMO number for each
vessel is not included in the fixture data. Hence, we first match the contracts with
ship-specific data based on vessel name, year of build and DWT. Secondly, we match
remaining contracts with vessels by ex-name, year of build and DWT.
3.1.4 Macro-level data
Clarksons SIN also provides additional data on freight market conditions and fuel prices
regarding the Capesize segment.
Freight rate indices
The Baltic indices are freight market indicators giving insight into supply and demand
trends for different routes and consist of weekly average earnings ($/tonne) for a typical
non-scrubber Capesize vessel. We note that the literature has moved away from the freight
market index as an explanatory variable for micro freight rate formation (Adland et al.,
2017c). However, when analyzing vessel speeds, we include the appropriate freight rate
from BCI C2, BCI C3, BCI C5, BCI C7 or BCI C17. In cases where voyages are on routes
without a corresponding Baltic rate, proxies based on distance traveled are applied. For
example, BCI C3 is the longest route traveling from Brazil to China (approx. 11,500 nm)
and BCI C5 is the shortest route traveling from West Australia to China (approx. 3,500
nm) in our specification. The difference in voyage length affects the differences in the
$/tonne freight rates, illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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BCI C5: W Australia/Qingdao
BCI C7: Bolivar/Rotterdam
BCI C17: Saldanha Bay-Qingdao
Bunker prices
The development in bunker prices is important for shipowners and charterers as fuel
costs account for a large proportion of the voyage costs (Stopford, 2009). Historic weekly
bunker prices from the main bunker locations Fujairah, Panama, Singapore, Rotterdam
and Gibraltar are extracted from Clarksons (SIN). In addition, we specify a bunker price
proxy for each voyage leg by locating the nearest bunker location at the starting date of
both the laden and ballast legs.
In this thesis, we use two fuel types, IFO 380 representing HFO and VLS IFO representing
VLSFO. The bunker price is measured in $/tonne. VLSFO bunker price data is only
available from November 2019 and onwards. We assume that all vessels use HFO before
IMO 2020 as this is the cheapest fuel option. As non-scrubber vessels would not be
allowed to carry HFO after January 1, 2020, a vessel is categorized as carrying VLSFO
if the ending date of the voyage is after the policy change, in order to comply with the
regulation.
Braemer ACM Shipbroking (2021) argue that many market participants expected a fuel
price spread of 200 $/tonne before Covid-19 and the sharp oil price decline in March 2020.
However, after the initial shocks, the fuel price spread stabilized at around 100 $/tonne
for the rest of 2020, supported by Figure 3.2.
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3.2 The Capesize fleet
The capital expenditure for scrubber retrofitting ranges from $2 million to $6 million,
depending on the scrubber solution (Danish Ship Finance, 2018). The bunker spread is
an essential factor determining the payback period. For example, with a bunker spread
of $100, the payback period is nearly four years, while a spread of $200 would result in
a payback period less than two years. Therefore, older vessels near the end of their life
cycle find it less attractive to invest in a scrubber, as uncertainty in the bunker spread
impacts the profitability of the scrubber investment. Interestingly, 80% of vessels built
after 2017 have a scrubber installed in our AIS sample. Furthermore, 72% of these vessels
installed the scrubber at the design stage, while 28% are retrofitted. However, only 18%
of vessels built before 2005 have a scrubber installed.
Age and size characteristics of the Capesize fleet are presented in Table 3.1. The cleaned
AIS sample consists of 501 scrubber vessels and 1,104 non-scrubber vessels. VLOC vessels
are presented in a separate panel due to the difference in vessel characteristics.
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Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber
N 388 987 388 987
Mean 2012 2012 187,276 185,167
SD 4 4 13,999 13,311
Min 2003 2003 149,733 120,397




Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber
N 113 117 113 117
Mean 2014 2015 332,306 290,470
SD 3 4 68,556 48,611
Min 2004 2004 226,371 226,381
Max 2019 2020 403,919 402,303
Panel (a) displays similar vessel characteristics for the two groups consisting of 388
scrubber and 987 non-scrubber Capesize vessels. Contrary, the VLOC vessels in Panel (b)
are more balanced with 113 scrubber vessels and 117 non-scrubber vessels. The average
vessel size between the group of VLOC vessels differs substantially.
3.3 Routes
Figure 3.3 illustrates the movement and trading patterns of the Capesize fleet for 2019-
2020. The blue lines represent Capesize vessels, while the green lines represent VLOC
vessels. We observe that the main routes are from Australia to the Far East, Atlantic
America to the Far East and Africa to the Far East. The main drybulk areas in the Far
East are China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Singapore. Further, the figure illustrates the
fixed travel pattern of VLOC vessels mainly sailing between Brazil and China.
The sailing patterns between the respective areas correspond with the supply and demand
patterns of iron ore. According to Statista (2020a,b), Australia, Brazil and South Africa
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are the top three iron ore exporting countries, while China, Japan and South Korea are
the top three iron ore importing countries
Figure 3.3: Capesize voyages in 2019-2020
We have further utilized AIS data for 2020 to illustrate the movement of scrubber vessels
and non-scrubber vessels after the implementation of IMO 2020, illustrated in Figure 3.4.
The blue lines represent scrubber vessels, while the green lines represent non-scrubber
vessels. Interestingly, the trading patterns of scrubber vessels are mainly on the routes
from Australia to the Far East, from Atlantic America to the Far East and from Africa
to the Far East. Appendix A3 points out that these three routes account for 84% of all
scrubber voyages, and the percentage of scrubber vessels on each route is 27%, 50% and
22%, respectively.
Figure 3.4: Capesize voyages by scrubber status in 2020
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics
3.4.1 Summary statistics
The voyage distance and speed analysis are based on 36,767,462 AIS positions, derived
into 30,806 uniquely identified voyages and 120,047 weekly speed observations. A detailed
description of the data pre-processing and speed calculations are found in appendix A2.
The fixture data consists of 157 trip charter fixtures and 859 voyage charter fixtures in
2019-2020. Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics for the four main regressions.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics
(a) Summary statistics for distance
N Mean SD Min Max
Distance 30,806 5,555 3,202 1,501 17,302
Sailing days 30,806 24 15 5 75
Built 30,806 2012 4 2003 2020
DWT 30,806 198,938 42,880 120,397 403,919
(b) Summary statistics for speed
N Mean SD Min Max
Speed 120,047 11.43 1.43 8.00 17.32
Freight rate 120,047 11.02 5.41 2.88 28.79
Fuel price 120,047 366.90 87.95 124.75 775.50
Built 120,047 2012 4 2003 2020
DWT 120,047 202,927 50,765 120,397 403,919
(c) Summery statistics for charter type
N Mean SD Min Max
Trip charter 1,016 0.15 0.36 0 1
Built 1,016 2011 4 1998 22
DWT 1,016 179,875 10,077 106,355 261,761
(d) Summary statistics for voyage charter contracts
N Mean SD Min Max
$/tonne rate 832 11.42 5.91 3.40 32.08
Distance 832 6,844 3,755 2,857 14,592
Age 832 2011 4 2000 2020
DWT 832 180,511 9,987 106,355 261,761
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The minimum and maximum freight rates in Panel (b) capture the market fluctuations
over time and differences between routes. Similarly, the values on fuel price capture the
price volatility over time and differences in HFO and VLSFO, illustrated in Figure 3.2.
We note that the average design speed in our sample is 14.9 knots, which is substantially
higher than the average observed speeds. The mean value for the variable Trip charter
in Panel (c) represents the average number of trip charter contracts relative to the total
number of contracts in 2019-2020. It implies that there are 15% trip charter contracts and
85% voyage charter contracts in the sample. Finally, we note that DWT is lower in panels
(c) and (d) compared to panels (a) and (b). A reasonable explanation is that VLOC
vessels predominantly operate on fixed routes between Brazil and China, as illustrated in
Figure 3.3, and therefore not appearing in the spot market.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics by scrubber status and year
Panel (a) in Table 3.3 displays descriptive statistics on distance both before and after
IMO 2020 for scrubber and non-scrubber vessels. Further, Panel (b) illustrates similar
statistics for average weekly speeds.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for distance and speed
(a) Distance by scrubber status for 2019-2020
Pre-policy (2019) Post-policy (2020)
Non- Non-
Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber
N 887 14,531 4,776 10,612
16% 58% 84% 42%
Distance 5,357 5,432 6,289 5,410
(3,055) (3,102) (3,618) (3,104)
Sailing days 23 24 27 25
(13) (14) (15) (15)
Built 2013 2011 2014 2011
(4) (4) (4) (4)
DWT 204,969 197,341 215,159 193,320
(43,068) (41,476) (58,709) (33,466)
(b) Speed by scrubber status for 2019-2020
Pre-policy (2019) Post-policy (2020)
Non- Non-
Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber
N 3,310 54,649 20,127 41,961
14% 57% 86% 43%
Speed 11.79 11.43 11.74 11.25
(1.45) (1.43) (1.44) (1.39)
Freight rate 13.39 11.58 11.31 9.98
(5.88) (5.71) (5.13) (4.87)
Fuel price 388.19 402.77 274.71 362.71
(59.31) (45.64) (50.16) (110.11)
Built 2014 2011 2014 2011
(4) (4) (4) (4)
DWT 210,977 222,626 200,970 195,391
(50,742) (67,019) (49,505) (39,634)
Note: % of scrubber status group, SD in parenthesis
In Panel (a), we note an apparent increase in voyages by scrubber vessels and a decrease
in voyages by non-scrubber vessels. The average distance traveled and the number of
sailing days increase for scrubber vessels in 2020, implying that scrubber vessels are placed
on the long-haul routes. Further, we experience an increase in average DWT for scrubber
vessels. A greater DWT for scrubber VLOC vessels compared to non-scrubber VLOC
vessels in Table 3.1, can partially contribute to the difference in DWT shown in Panel (a).
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These findings correspond with Braemer ACM Shipbroking (2021), arguing that scrubber
vessels are of greater size and used on long-haul voyages. As vessels on long-haul routes
generally spend more time at sea and less time handling cargo in port, the ship operators
take advantage of the fuel cost savings.
The increase in the number of observations from 2019 to 2020 and the age difference
between scrubber vessels and non-scrubber vessels can potentially be explained in two
ways. Firstly, it can indicate that newer vessels are utilized to a greater extent compared
to older vessels. Secondly, as pointed out in Section 3.2, 80% of vessels built after 2017
have a scrubber installed. In addition, 72% are newbuilds entering the market, and 28%
are retrofitted vessels, both positively impacting the year of build. Finally, it is worth
noting that the statistics for non-scrubber vessels in Panel (a) are relatively similar in
2019 and 2020.
Panel (b) displays a difference in average weekly speeds between the groups. We
observe similar weekly speed observations for scrubber vessels, while non-scrubber vessels
experience a decrease in average weekly speeds. The decrease in speeds for non-scrubber
vessels is consistent with the presumption that increased fuel costs reduce vessel speeds.
The freight rate represented by the Baltic indices indicates a similar decrease for both
groups, in line with the change in market conditions from 2019 to 2020. As we would
expect, scrubber vessels have a lower average fuel price compared to non-scrubber vessels
in 2020.
When examining observed speeds for the laden and ballast leg in Table 3.4, we witness
differences in speeds between the two legs. This corresponds with the study by Adland
and Jia (2018), where greater average speeds are explained by a lower draught ratio,
meaning less resistance and lower fuel consumption. In addition, they argue that charter
party clauses constrain the potential for speed optimization on the laden leg.
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Table 3.4: Speed comparison for laden and ballast leg for 2019-2020
Pre-policy (2019) Post-policy (2020)
Non- Non-
Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber
N (Laden) 1,857 32,192 10,466 22,851
Speed (Laden) 11.25 10.86 11.31 10.78
(1.22) (1.20) (1.28) (1.25)
N (Ballast) 1,899 24,319 9,215 17,248
Speed (Ballast) 12.37 12.16 12.22 11.88
(1.41) (1.37) (1.46) (1.33)
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics for charter type and $/tonne rates
(a) Charter type by scrubber status for 2019-2020
Pre-policy (2019) Post-policy (2020)
Non- Non-
Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber
N 51 490 153 322
25% 60% 75% 40%
Trip charter 0.27 0.22 0.07 0.08
(0.45) (0.41) (0.25) (0.27)
Built 2012 2010 2012 2010
(4) (4) (4) (4)
DWT 182,914 179,133 180,994 179,990
(12,210) (9,558) (10,181) (10,329)
(b) Voyage charter contract by scrubber status for 2019-2020
Pre-policy (2019) Post-policy (2020)
Non- Non-
Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber
N 37 369 140 286
21% 56% 79% 44%
$/tonne rate 12.82 11.76 11.22 10.90
(6.26) (6.32) (5.08) (5.68)
Distance 6,164 6,370 7,599 7,175
(3,453) (3,603) (3,885) (3,839)
Built 2012 2010 2012 2010
(4) (4) (4) (4)
DWT 183,759 179,624 181,329 180,833
(13,370) (9,832) (10,476) (9,332)
Note: % of scrubber status group, SD in parenthesis
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Table 3.5 presents descriptive statistics before and after IMO 2020 for scrubber and
non-scrubber vessels in Panel (a) for charter type and in Panel (b) for voyage charter
freight rates.
In Panel (a), we observe an increase in scrubber fixtures and a decrease in non-scrubber
fixtures from 2019 to 2020. In addition, there is a decrease in both voyage charter
and trip charter contracts for non-scrubber vessels in 2020, supported by Figure 3.5.
One explanation is that vessels switch to the scrubber group during the sample period.
Interestingly, there is a decrease in trip charter contracts and an increase in voyage charter
contracts for the scrubber vessels. This supports the fact that shipowners investing in
a scrubber want to capitalize on the potential fuel cost savings and prefer to offer their
vessels on voyage charter contracts. We note that scrubber vessels are of newer build
compared to non-scrubber vessels. Further, the vessel size is similar in the two time
periods for both groups.
































































































































































(d) Non-scrubber vessels on trip charter
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Panel (b) consists of descriptive statistics for voyage charter fixtures. The average $/tonne
rate is greater for scrubber vessels, as longer voyage distances can partially explain the
differences in rates. In addition, size and age difference affects the rates. The results are
reasonable as the distance differences and vessel characteristics are not controlled for in
the mean rate. The total number of voyage charter contracts is relatively steady in the
sample period, supporting the notion that a decrease in trip charter contracts causes the
decrease in the total number of fixtures in Panel (a).
Table 3.6 presents a closer breakdown of the descriptive statistics for selected voyage
charter fixtures. The table displays the number of contracts by scrubber status for only
2020 with the corresponding mean freight rates. We have grouped the routes based on
geographical regions to increase the sample size of each micro-market with similar $/tonne
rates.
Table 3.6: Voyage charter rates per route in 2020
N Mean ($/Tonne)
Scrubber Non-Scrubber Scrubber Non-Scrubber
Australia - Far East 63 142 6.87 6.40
Atlantic America - Far East 65 110 15.46 16.44




We have created a dynamic and flexible model to investigate the effects of IMO 2020
on voyage distance, average weekly speed, charter type and voyage charter freight rates.
Applying the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) method with two-way fixed effects (TWFE),
as presented in appendix A5, allows us to analyze the causal effects of IMO 2020 with the
model:
Yit = β ∗ Scrubberit ∗ Postt + α ∗ Scrubberit + µ ∗Xit + δi + γt + εit (4.1)
Where i indexes the individual vessels, and t specifies the time by date for regressions
on distance, charter type and voyage charter. Further, t specifies the time by week for
speed. Yit is the dependent variable. Conditional on the effects we are analyzing, the
dependent variable is (1) distance, (2) weekly average speed, (3) binary variable for charter
type or (4) the voyage charter freight rate. The coefficient β represents the IMO 2020
implementation effect (DiD estimate) and is labeled SP in the regression outputs.
Postt is a dummy variable indicating whether an observation is after the policy
implementation on January 1. 2020. Further, Scrubberit is a dummy variable defining
if an observation is in the treatment or control group. A scrubber vessel is categorized
in the treatment group and given a value equal to 1 if the starting date of a voyage is
after January 1, 2020. Contrary, a non-scrubber vessel will be in the control group with a
value equal to 0. This causes the dynamic aspect to the model, as scrubber vessels have
different treatment periods reflecting the scrubber’s installation timing.
Xit are various covariates that may affect the dependent variable in the model. Based on
the findings of Ronen (1982) and Adland and Jia (2016, 2018) regarding speed analysis,
we include continuous variables for freight rate and bunker price, and a dummy variable
for loading condition. The different freight rates from Baltic Exchange are illustrated in
3.1. The fuel price variable varies by time and geographical location.
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The fixed effects are included to absorb much of the residual variation (Kearney and
Levine, 2014). By controlling for the heterogeneity in our sample, we can isolate the
effects of scrubber installation. Including vessel fixed effects δi controls for differences
in time-invariant characteristics such as vessel size and age. The time fixed effects γt,
picks up the time-variant effects such as market conditions. In addition, we apply route
fixed effects to the models on speed and $/tonne spot rate to control for geographical
differences.
Regarding inference, Bertrand et al. (2004) argue that one must cluster on the unit of
policy implementation if possible. After testing for heteroscedasticity using Breusch-Pagan
(Breusch and Pagan, 1979), all our models use clustered standard errors on vessel level as
observations within each group may not be independently and identically distributed.
The regression models for voyage distance and speed consist of linear and log-transformed
models, while the voyage charter freight rate models are solely log-transformed. The
market conditions have a large impact on spot rates, with a lower bound close to zero in
poor markets and greatly increased rates in thriving markets caused by inelastic supply
curves in the short term. This leads to a positively skewed distribution, and it is reasonable
to use the natural logarithm on the dependent variable for the $/tonne rate (Alizadeh and
Talley, 2011; Adland et al., 2016). The reason for including log-transformed regression
models on voyage distance and speed is to ease the interpretation of coefficients. The
interpretation of the dummy coefficients in the log-transformed models is the following:
If D switches from 0 to 1, the % impact of D on Y is 100[exp(c) − 1] (4.2)
The identifying assumption underlying this research design is not a random assignment of
scrubber vessels and non-scrubber vessel, but rather that these groups would have trended
similarly in the absence of IMO 2020 (appendix A5). To verify the identifying assumption,
we test for parallel trend in Section 5.5
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5 Discussion of Results
The subsequent analysis consists of six sections to present and discuss how IMO 2020 has
affected various micro-market behaviors in the drybulk market. The first four sections
discuss the effects of scrubber installation on voyage distance, vessel speeds, charter
type and voyage charter freight rates. The final two sections review the parallel trend
assumption and discuss uncertainties potentially influencing the results.
5.1 Are scrubber vessels sailing on longer routes than
non-scrubber vessels after IMO2020?
Firstly, we investigate if installing a scrubber influences the sailing distance after IMO
2020. The descriptive statistics indicate that scrubber vessels operate on longer duration
voyages, corresponding with the findings of Braemer ACM Shipbroking (2021). This
suggests that vessels with lower marginal costs due to reduced fuel costs, increase the
savings by spending more time at sea. The effects of scrubber installation on distance are
tested using the regressions in Table 5.1. Models (5) and (6) are log-transformed to ease
the interpretation of the coefficients.
Table 5.1: Scrubber effects on voyage distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance Distance Distance Distance lnDistance lnDistance
SP 483.2∗∗ 180.1 0.0714∗∗ 0.0238
(176.4) (138.1) (0.0271) (0.0213)
Scrubber 608.7∗∗∗ 422.4∗∗∗ 300.2 275.8∗ 0.0439 0.0401
(107.4) (92.16) (182.9) (136.0) (0.0280) (0.0210)
Post -197.3∗∗∗ -0.0352∗∗∗
(52.79) (0.00852)
VLOC 1,393.4∗∗∗ 1,379.4∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(249.8) (249.3) (0.0375)
N 30,806 30,806 30,806 30,806 30,806 30,806
Method OLS OLS DiD DiD DiD DiD
V esselFE No Yes No Yes No Yes
TimeFE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on vessel level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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The scrubber dummy in model (1) is significant at a 1% level. The coefficient indicates
that scrubber vessels on average sail 609 nautical miles longer than non-scrubber vessels
per voyage in the sample period. The model does not account for differences in the year
of build or vessel size. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the VLOC vessels have a fixed trading
pattern primarily operating between Brazil and China. Therefore, we include a dummy
variable controlling for the effects of VLOC vessels. The variable is significant at a 1%
level, indicating that VLOC vessels on average sail 1,393 nautical miles longer than the
remaining Capesize fleet.
In model (2), TWFE are included to control for market conditions and vessel heterogeneity.
Scrubber vessels are on average larger and of newer build. From panel (a) in Table 3.3,
the difference in vessel characteristics increases from 2019 to 2020, as age and size of
non-scrubber vessels remain constant. In general, newer vessels are more energy efficient
due to improvements in designs (Lindstad and Eskeland, 2015). In addition, larger vessels
can take advantage of economies of scale. Both factors impact the route placement and we
expect a decrease in the scrubber coefficient once we control for the vessel characteristics.
The time fixed effects control for market conditions such as changes in freight rates and
fuel prices over time. The model gives a significant coefficient at a 1% level, indicating
that scrubber vessels on average sail 422 nautical miles longer than non-scrubber vessels
per voyage.
The DiD framework in model (3) allows us to analyze if scrubber vessels sail longer than
non-scrubber vessels after the policy implementation. The SP coefficient represents the
DiD estimate and is significant at a 5% level. The coefficient suggests that the difference
in voyage length between scrubber and non-scrubber vessels increases by 483 nautical
miles after IMO 2020. The VLOC coefficient indicates that VLOC vessels on average
sail 1,379 nautical miles longer than the rest of the Capesize fleet. Similar to model
(3), the log-transformed model in (5) returns significance in the SP coefficient at a 5%
level, suggesting that scrubber vessels sail 7.4% longer than non-scrubber vessels after
the implementation of IMO 2020. In addition, the VLOC dummy is significant at a 1%
level and indicates that VLOC vessels, on average, sail 21.5% longer than the remaining
Capesize fleet.
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5.2 Are scrubber vessels increasing sailing speeds compared to non-scrubber vessels after
IMO 2020?
For the same reasons as in model (2), we control for differences in vessel characteristics
and market conditions by applying TWFE in model (4). The SP coefficient loses its
significance once we control for differences in vessel characteristics and market conditions.
This implies that the difference in voyage length between scrubber and non-scrubber
vessels does not increase due to IMO 2020. Similar to model (4), we do not experience a
significant SP coefficient in the log-transformed model (6).
Overall, our analysis suggests that scrubber vessels sail on longer voyages. However, we do
not find evidence that IMO 2020 has resulted in an increased difference in voyage length
between scrubber and non-scrubber vessels when accounting for vessel heterogeneity and
market fluctuations. The contradiction of results in model (5) and (6) indicate that vessel
characteristics such as age and size potentially explain the difference in distance, rather
than the scrubber installation or the policy change itself.
5.2 Are scrubber vessels increasing sailing speeds
compared to non-scrubber vessels after IMO 2020?
The second topic of investigation is whether scrubber vessels increase speeds compared
to non-scrubber vessels after IMO 2020. Table 5.2 presents the regression models. The
purpose of models (1), (2) and (3) is to determine if the scrubber dummy affects vessel
speeds. Models (4), (5) and (6) examine whether the difference in vessel speeds increases for
scrubber vessels compared to non-scrubber vessels after IMO 2020. The dependent variable
is weekly average speed, presented in knots. Models (7), (8) and (9) are log-transformed
models of (4), (5) and (6).
All variables in model (1) are significant. The scrubber coefficient indicates that scrubber
vessels sail 0.32 knots faster than non-scrubber vessels. The laden variable is significant at
a 1% level and indicates that vessels sail 1.2 knots slower on laden legs compared to ballast
legs. This is in line with the findings of Adland and Jia (2018). The freight rate and
bunker price coefficients are significant at a 1% and 5% level, respectively. The coefficient
signs correspond with classical speed optimization theory. Simultaneously, the effects of
change in freight rates and fuel prices on speed are minor, supporting previous empirical
testing of the classical speed theory (Aßmann et al., 2015; Adland and Jia, 2016, 2018).























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2 Are scrubber vessels increasing sailing speeds compared to non-scrubber vessels after
IMO 2020?
When time and vessel fixed effects are included in model (2), the scrubber coefficient
indicates that scrubber vessels sail 0.29 knots faster than non-scrubber vessels. As vessel
characteristics such as age and size are controlled for in vessel fixed effects, the scrubber
coefficient decreases but remains significant at a 1% level. We exclude the freight rate
and bunker price variables from the model, since the market conditions are controlled for
in time fixed effects.
In model (3) we include route fixed effects to control for route differences such as voyage
duration and loading condition. Consequently, we observe an insignificant laden dummy.
However, the scrubber variable is significant at a 1% level, suggesting that scrubber vessels
on average sail 0.26 knots faster than non-scrubber vessels. Furthermore, as we distinguish
between a laden- and a ballast leg in our dataset, the route fixed effects capture differences
in the two legs, hence explaining the insignificance of the laden dummy.
The DiD framework is applied in model (4) to investigate if IMO 2020 has affected vessel
speeds. We experience significance in the SP coefficient at a 10% level. This indicates that
the difference in vessel speeds increases by 0.10 knots between scrubber- and non-scrubber
vessels after IMO 2020. Time and vessel fixed effects are included in model (5). The SP
coefficient is significant at a 5% level, suggesting that scrubber vessels increase speeds by
0.14 knots relative to non-scrubber vessels because of the policy implementation. The
freight rate and bunker price variables are excluded for the same reason as in model (2).
Model (6) includes route fixed effects, resulting in a significance at a 1% level for the DiD
estimator. The SP coefficient indicates that IMO 2020 has increased the difference in
speeds between scrubber and non-scrubber vessels by 0.14 knots. The effects of including
route fixed effects on the laden dummy are similar to model (3). The model shows that
scrubber vessels increase speeds compared to non-scrubber vessels after the IMO 2020
regulation.
As the effects of scrubber, freight rates and fuel prices on speed are small, model (7) is
log-transformed to ease the interpretation of the coefficients. The freight rate and fuel
price variables are significant at a 1% level, with a similar sign as in model (4). This
suggests that a 1% change in freight rate leads to a 0.01% increase in speed. Further,
a 1% change in fuel price leads to a 0.01% decrease in speed. The SP coefficient is
significant at a 10% level, indicating that the difference in vessel speeds between scrubber
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and non-scrubber vessels increases by 0.9% after IMO 2020. Both model (8) and model (9)
return similar results as (5) and (6), where the SP coefficients indicate that the difference
in vessel speeds between scrubber and non-scrubber vessels increases by 1.2% after the
policy change.
Overall, the findings suggest that scrubber vessels do increase vessel speeds due to IMO
2020. Even though our results indicate that scrubbers significantly affect vessel speeds,
we experience minor effects. The findings contradict the study of Adland et al. (2017a)
on speeds in Emission Control Areas (ECAs) with stricter limits on sulphur content in
marine fuels. Recent literature on speed optimization denies the magnitude of freight
market conditions and fuel price on speed (Aßmann et al., 2015; Adland and Jia, 2016,
2018), especially when observed speeds differ from the design speed (Adland et al., 2020).
The calculated speeds are lower than design speeds in our sample and we observe similar
limited effects of freight rates and fuel price.
5.3 Are scrubber vessels less likely to be used on trip
charter contracts after IMO 2020
The third area of interest is to investigate if shipowners are less likely to offer scrubber
vessels on trip charter contracts after IMO 2020. Shipowners have the flexibility to offer
their vessels on either voyage charter or trip charter. As investments in energy efficiency
rarely result in higher freight rates (Agnolucci et al., 2014; Adland et al., 2017b), the
shipowner will primarily benefit from their scrubber investment in the form of potential
fuel cost savings, by offering their vessels on voyage charter contracts. Therefore, it is
interesting to test if there exists a market failure related to this principal-agent problem,
where the charterer in a trip charter contract benefits from the shipowner’s investment.
We use a linear probability model (LPM) with a dummy for trip charter contracts as
the dependent binary variable in Table 5.3. The dummy for scrubber installation is the
explanatory variable in models (1) and (2), while the DiD estimator is the explanatory
variable in models (3) and (4).
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Table 5.3: Scrubber effects on charter type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trip charter Trip charter Trip charter Trip charter
SP -0.068 -0.375∗
(0.079) (0.187)
Scrubber -0.045 -0.089 0.056 0.187
(0.028) (0.110) (0.074) (0.181)
Post -0.141∗∗∗
(0.025)
N 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016
Method OLS OLS DiD DiD
V esselFe No Yes No Yes
TimeFe No Yes No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on vessel level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In model (1), the scrubber variable is insignificant, indicating that the scrubber installation
does not influence the shipowner’s choice of offering their vessel on trip charter versus
voyage charter. The insignificance may be explained by the fact that we study the effects
on the entire sample, while the benefits of fuel cost savings only occurred after January 1,
2020. We experience the same outcome when including TWFE in model (2). Including
vessel fixed effects has a small impact on charter type, as the vessel characteristics
on average are similar between scrubber and non-scrubber vessels. In model (3), the
insignificant SP coefficient suggests an existence of market failure in the freight market.
The model indicates the shipowners investing in scrubbers do not offer their vessels on
less trip charter contracts. This suggests that the charterer accrues the potential fuel cost
savings from the scrubber investment.
Contrary, the DiD estimator in model (4) is significant at a 10% level when time- and
vessel fixed effects are included. The negative coefficient indicates that a scrubber vessel
is 37.5% less likely to be offered on a trip charter than a voyage charter after IMO 2020.
The change in significance indicates that important factors regarding market conditions
are picked up in time fixed effects, as vessel characteristics are similar for scrubber and
non-scrubber vessels. The SP coefficient suggests that shipowners are more likely to offer
scrubber vessels on voyage charter contracts, where they pay for fuel costs and benefit
from potential fuel cost savings. This indicates a strategic adjustment to the policy change,
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suggesting the market failure on charter type is not an issue as a result of IMO 2020.
5.4 Are scrubber vessels trading at a lower $/Tonne
rate relative to non-scrubber vessels after IMO
2020?
Finally, we investigate if scrubber vessels trade at lower voyage charter rates compared to
non-scrubber vessels. This allows us to investigate if there is a split of potential fuel cost
savings between the shipowner and the charterer in the spot market.
The freight rate in a perfectly competitive market is determined by the marginal cost
of the marginal vessel, where the bidding on transportation is confined within a specific
geographical area (Norman, 1979; Adland et al., 2016). Suppose scrubber vessels cluster
on specific routes, the freight rates can decrease below the traditional marginal cost of a
non-scrubber vessel. Significant lower rates in our models can be an indication of such a
scenario. We analyze the routes of Australia to the Far East, Atlantic America to the
Far East and from Africa to the Far East, as these routes represent micro-markets, where
scrubber vessels have a substantial impact on the supply side, illustrated in appendix
A3. Table 5.4 presents the OLS and DiD models. The dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of the $/tonne spot rate.
Table 5.4: Scrubber effects on voyage charter freight rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnRate lnRate lnRate lnRate lnRate lnRate
SP -0.056 0.449∗∗ 0.014
(0.098) (0.142) (0.060)
Scrubber 0.041 0.219 0.016 0.112 -0.166 0.004
(0.043) (0.175) (0.056) (0.086) (0.192) (0.072)
Post -0.078
(0.042)
N 832 832 832 832 832 832
V esselFE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
TimeFE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
RouteFE No No Yes No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on vessel level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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In model (1), the scrubber dummy is insignificant, suggesting that scrubber vessels trade
at a similar $/tonne rate as non-scrubber vessels. Model (2) incorporates fixed effects for
both the time differences and vessel individuality. There is no change to the significance
of the scrubber dummy, potentially explained by the similarities in vessel characteristics
illustrated in Panel (b) of Table 3.5. However, as the $/tonne rate and distance traveled
are greater for scrubber vessels than non-scrubber vessels, we include route fixed effects to
control for these differences. We experience the same outcome in model (3) as in models
(1) and (2).
Models (4)-(6) incorporate the DiD framework. The SP coefficient in model (4) shows no
significance, suggesting that the difference in $/tonne rates is unchanged between scrubber
and non-scrubber vessels after IMO 2020. However, including time and vessel fixed effects
to model (5) tells a different story. The DiD estimator is significant at a 5% level, and the
coefficient indicates that the difference in $/tonne rate between scrubber and non-scrubber
vessels increases by 56.7% after IMO 2020. This can either indicate that scrubber vessels
trade at a premium or that scrubber vessels, to a greater extent, trade on long-haul routes
with higher $/tonne rates. The latter is supported by the descriptive statistics, where
scrubber vessels are sailing longer per voyage compared to non-scrubber vessels.
Therefore, we include route fixed effects in model (6) to account for variation in rates for
different routes. This leads to an insignificant DiD estimator at any level and indicates
that scrubber vessels do not trade at a lower $/tonne rate compared to non-scrubber
vessels after IMO 2020. Overall, our analysis suggests that shipowners of scrubber vessels
accrue the potential savings from lower fuel costs. The investment in scrubber contributes
to a reduction in marginal costs, while the marginal income remains at the same level for
both groups.
5.5 Testing parallel trend assumption
To test for parallel trends, we run a set of regressions using our final DiD model on each
topic of investigation. The purpose is to analyze if there exists a parallel trend before
the regulation and if the treatment has a clear effect ex-post. We control for vessel fixed
effects and time fixed effects in all models. In addition, we control for route fixed effects
in the models on speed and voyage charter rate.
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the coefficient plot of the DiD estimates relative to the first quarter
after the IMO 2020 implementation (2020q1). We compare the difference between scrubber
and non-scrubber observations against the base quarter. Hence, the reason for placing
this point to the far left in each panel. The dot equals the DiD estimate for the respective
quarter, while the whiskers indicate the 95% confidence intervals. The dots before 2020q1
should follow the red line, indicating that the treatment and control group have parallel
trends. Contrary, if the regulation has an effect on the treatment group, we expect the
dots after the dashed vertical line to move away from zero, either in a positive or negative
direction. We analyze the parallel trend assumption by visual inspection.




















































































































































(d) Voyage freight rate
Panel (a) illustrates some irregularities in the trend, as two of the quarters are significantly
different. Visual examination of the pre-trend indicates an upward slope. The dots after
2020q1 indicate similar DiD estimates for the two groups. The treatment effect seems to
occur prior to IMO 2020, as we see an increase from 2019q2 before stabilizing. However,
the post-period does not return a significant difference on distance.
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In Panel (b), we observe pre-trend DiD estimates close to zero, indicating that the parallel
trend assumption holds. The exception is 2019q3, returning a significant difference between
scrubber and non-scrubber vessels. Further, the treatment effect is positive in the second
half of 2020, suggesting that scrubber vessels increase speeds compared to non-scrubber
vessels after IMO 2020. However, the treatment effect does not contribute to a significant
difference in the quarterly DiD estimates.
Panel (c) suggests that the parallel trend assumption is fulfilled, as there are no deviations
from the red line in the pre-trend. After the implementation of IMO 2020, all the
coefficients turn negative, suggesting a negative treatment effect. However, the whiskers
suggest no significant difference in the percentage of trip charter contracts relative to
voyage charter contracts after IMO 2020.
We experience pre-trend DiD estimates close to zero in Panel (d), indicating that the
parallel trend assumption holds. The treatment effect seems to positively impact the
natural logarithm of voyage charter freight rates, with the effect starting in 2019q4. The
whiskers do not indicate a significant difference in $/tonne rates for each quarter after the
regulation.
Overall, the parallel trend assumption in panels (a) and (b) seems to be fulfilled by visual
inspection, despite some exceptions in the pre-trend estimates. The pre-trend is clear in
panels (c) and (d), indicating that the parallel trend assumption holds.
5.6 Elements of uncertainty
Distance calculation based on shortest-path algorithm
There may be some uncertainty in the distance and speed calculations due to the choice
of distance algorithm. By using a shortest-path algorithm between the AIS observations,
we do not account for non-sailable waters and land areas that may hinder the direct path
between two observations. This can potentially underestimate the distance calculations
and overestimate the calculated speeds. As the frequency of AIS observations decreases,
the duration between two AIS positions increases, causing uncertainty to the actual sailing
path. Hence, the estimation errors may increase. This is further discussed in appendix
A2.
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Short sample period
We only have 12 months of data post-regulation, as IMO 2020 entered into force on 1.
January 2020. Consequently, the sample size of fixture data is relatively small. This
affects the micro-market analysis and may create uncertainty regarding the results on the
charter type and the voyage charter freight rate. In addition, we only account for 2019 as
our pre-treatment year. By increasing the sample period before 2020, the market cycles
in the drybulk market could be accounted for to a greater extent. Further, increasing the
sample size prior to IMO 2020 could improve the testing of the parallel trend assumption.
Covid-19 effects on drybulk shipping
The shipping industry has experienced irregularities through 2020 due to the covid-19
pandemic. According to Clarksons Research (2021a), the total drybulk market experienced
trade growth of 0.5% for 2020. However, there are large differences in the trade growth of
specific drybulk commodities. For example, the coal trade decreased by 9.4%, while the
iron ore- trade increased by 4.8%. As there are several effects occurring in 2020, there
exists potential uncertainty regarding the causal effect relationships.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, we have investigated the effects of IMO 2020 on the drybulk market using
the DiD framework. The vessel sample consists of Capesize vessels separated by scrubber
vessels and non-scrubber vessels. We have studied how the implementation of the low
sulphur emission policy has affected voyage distance and vessel speeds backed by AIS
data, as well as charter types and $/tonne rates in voyage charter contracts. Our analysis
suggests that IMO 2020 has affected drybulk shipping in different ways when examining
various micro-market behaviors.
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, our analysis indicates that
scrubber vessels sail on longer routes compared to non-scrubber vessels. However, we do
not find evidence that the difference in voyage distance increases as a result of IMO 2020.
This suggests that other factors such as age and vessel size potentially affect the route
placement to a greater extent.
Secondly, our models show that the difference in speeds between scrubber and non-scrubber
vessels increases after IMO 2020. These findings are in line with maritime economic theory
suggesting that lower fuel costs for HFO compared to VLSFO results in greater speeds,
all else equal.
Thirdly, our model finds little evidence of market failure in the form of a principal-agent
problem concerning preferred charter type. The results indicate that shipowners investing
in scrubber installation are more likely to offer their vessel on voyage charter contracts
after IMO 2020. Hence, shipowners with scrubber vessels are more likely to benefit from
the potential fuel cost savings.
Finally, our analysis suggests that there is no difference in voyage charter freight rates
for scrubber vessels and non-scrubber vessels. This implies that shipowners of scrubber
vessels retain the same marginal income as non-scrubber vessels, while the marginal cost
is reduced relative to non-scrubber vessels. Hence, the shipowners of scrubber vessels
accrue the potential savings from the difference in fuel price between HFO and VLSFO.
Complemented by the fact that a scrubber vessel is less likely to be offered on a trip
charter, shipowners would benefit from the potential fuel cost savings.
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Table A1.1: AIS message components
Message component Definition Example
imo Unique ship identification 9593452
timestamp position Date and time for the position 2019-02-01T22:18:15Z
lon Longitude of the position -128.2225
lat Latitude of the position 5.219407
speed Observed speed in knots 10.9
draught Draught in meters 17.9
Table A1.1 illustrates relevant components in the initial AIS dataset. All vessels are
identified by a unique 7-digit IMO number. Contrary to vessel name, the IMO number is
constant throughout a vessel’s lifetime.
A2 Data Pre-processing
The data pre-processing is twofold and is separated by data processing of AIS data and
fixture data. The pre-processing for distance and speed consists of (1) combining the AIS
data with vessel characteristics from Clarksons WFR, (2) combining the dataset from
(1) with Signal Ocean voyage data to specify starting- and ending date of each voyage
and (3) cleaning the final data sample. The pre-processing for fixture data consists of
(1) combining vessel characteristics from Clarksons WFR with the fixture data and (2)
cleaning the final data sample.
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A2.1 Discussion on AIS reporting frequency
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Average hours between AIS observations
When splitting each year into six-month periods to highlight the frequency change in
August 2019, the difference in reporting frequency becomes apparent in average time and
distance between each AIS observation. Therefore, we have set a cut-off for voyages with
an average time between observations of greater than six hours and an average distance
between observations greater than 80 nautical miles. We also remove voyages with a
total distance of less than 1,500 nautical miles or greater than 18,000 nautical miles and
voyages with days sailing less than five days or greater than 75 days.
Table A2.1: Average time and distance between AIS observations
2019 2020
Number of voyages 15,418 15,388
Avg hours between observations 1.95 3.33
Avg nautical miles between observations 22.78 38.13
We have calculated the average time between AIS observations and the average distance
between the two points to validate our data further. We compare observations from 2019
with 2020 and experiences greater mean values in both time and distance in 2020. This
seems reasonable due to the different frequencies of observation in our dataset.
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A2.2 Data pre-processing of sample on distance and speed
The raw AIS dataset consists of 207,084,018 observations. We drop all observations with
registered speeds below three knots, indicating that the ship is at port or has an anchorage
status to reduce the initial dataset. In addition, we remove observations with speeds
over 18 knots. Further, we only keep observations for Capesize vessels determined by the
Clarksons WFR dataset by merging IMO numbers from AIS and Clarksons WFR.
The speeds are calculated based on the distance and time traveled from point to point
represented by the geographical position. Hence, we use a Haversine formula to compute the
geographical distances between two latitude-longitude positions (Positionn+1−Positionn).
The Haversine formula determines the great-circle distance in kilometers between two
points on an earth-sized sphere (Nichat, 2013). The distance is converted from kilometers
to nautical miles by dividing with 1.852 for speed estimation in knots. Hence, the distances
between the points are calculated with a shortest-path algorithm. The speed between








We exclude average speeds lower than 8 knots and greater than 18 knots from our sample.
Speeds lower than 8 knots suggests that a vessel is in port or drifting at very low speeds.
Further, speeds greater than 18 knots are considered unrepresentative as this would require
perfect sailing conditions, in addition to full steam ahead (Adland and Jia, 2016). Lastly,
the calculated speeds in knots are converted into time-weighted average speeds for each
vessel on a weekly basis.
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The AIS reported draught and the ship-specific design draught from Clarksons WFR
are combined to calculate the draught ratio for each voyage. This allows us to control
the accuracy of the laden and ballast leg determination of the Signal Ocean platform.
The histogram below illustrates the distribution of the draught ratios for weekly speed
observations.
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There is a clear separation in draught ratios at value 0.7. This fits well with the paper by
Adland and Jia (2016), stating that laden- and ballast legs equal a draught ratio from 0.8
to 1 and from 0.25 to 0.64, respectively. In addition, we remove observations of draught
ratios less than 0.4 and greater than 1.05. We include observed draught ratios between 1
and 1.05 to account for tropical draught, which is 1
48
above the summer load line of the
vessel and can lead to a draught ratio greater than 1 (Eyres and Bruce, 2012). Further,
we remove observations with a laden dummy equal to 1 and a draught ratio less than 0.7.
Similarly, this applies to observations with a laden dummy equal to 0 and a draught ratio
greater than 0.7.
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A2.3 Data pre-processing of sample on fixtures
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Note: Step 6 equals the sample for charter type, while Step 8 equals the sample for
voyage charter freight rates
Table A2.2: Explanation of cleaning steps for fixture data
Cleaning step Reason
0 Raw observations in sample period
1 Dropping missing names and
name equal to "TBN" (To be announced)
2 Matching on Name, Built, DWT
or Ex-name Built, DWT
3 Dropping missing rates
4 Dropping missing load and discharge values
5 Dropping missing laycan period
6 Dropping duplicate and conflicting rates
7 Dropping trip charter contracts
8 Dropping routes with few scrubber vessels
44 A3 Most traveled routes
A3 Most traveled routes
Table A3.1: Main Capesize routes by scrubber status for 2019-2020
Non- Non-
Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber
(2019) (2019) (2020) (2020)
Australia-Far East 288 4613 1183 3172
Atlantic America-Far East 93 1103 603 611
Africa-Far East 14 576 120 418
Atlantic America-Mediterranean/UK 16 315 65 123
West Coast South America -Far East 6 147 36 105
Far East - India/Pakistan 7 179 20 85
Black Sea/Sea Of Marmara - Far East 3 109 46 98
Africa-India/Pakistan 4 98 27 83
West Coast North America-Far East 13 92 22 58
Atlantic America-Black Sea 6 103 18 52






Australia- Far East 27.16% 52.00%
Atlantic America - Far East 49.67% 26.51%
Africa - Far East 22.30% 5.27%
Atlantic America - Mediterranean / UK 34.57% 2.86%
West Coast South America - Far East 25.53% 1.58%
Far East - India / Pakistan 19.05% 0.88%
Black Sea / Sea Of Marmara - Far East 31.94% 2.02%
Africa - India / Pakistan 24.55% 1.19%
West Coast North America - Far East 27.50% 0.97%
Atlantic America - Black Sea 25.71% 0.79%
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A4 Validation of distance calculations
Table A4.1: Route distance comparison
Route 1 2 3 2 - 1 3 - 1
Dampier - Qingdao 3443 3594 3582 139 152
Ponta Da Madeira - Dalian 11,973 12,088 12,688 115 715
Saldanha Bay - Tianjin 8024 8272 8564 112 141





We have compared the average calculated distance from our AIS sample with the ones
listed on sea-distance.org and Signal Ocean to validate our distance calculations. We only
experience minor differences, indicating that our approximations are reasonable.
A5 A review of the Difference-in-Differences method
The difference-in-difference (DiD) method is regarded as one of the most popular tools of
applied research design to evaluate the causal effect of public interventions (Kropko and
Kubinec, 2020). The DiD method consists of two time periods and two groups. In the
first period, none of the groups are treated. In the second period, one group is given a
treatment, while the other works as a control group. For example, a treatment could be a
vaccine or a law regulation only affecting the treatment group. The treatment effect can be
estimated by comparing the average change in outcomes experienced by the treated group
to the average change in outcomes experienced by the comparison group (Fredriksson and
Oliveira, 2019). Hence, the DiD estimate can be presented in the following manner, where
ȳ is the mean outcome variable:
DiD = (ȳs=Treatment,t=After − ȳs=Treatment,t=Before) − (ȳs=Control,t=After − ȳs=Control,t=Before)
(.3)
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The parallel trend assumption is essential. In the absence of a treatment, the two groups
should follow a parallel trend over time (Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2020). This implies
that the time series of outcomes in each group should differ by a fixed amount in each
period and should exhibit a common set of period-specific changes. This would imply
that the two groups should follow parallel trend lines as panel (a) in Figure A5.1 (Wing
et al., 2018).
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(b) DiD treatment effect
We illustrate the general DiD estimate using the OLS framework, where the β coefficient
represents the DiD estimate. Yit is the dependent outcome variable for unit i at the time,
t. Further, Dit can be defined as the value of treatment for unit i, at time t. In addition,
δi and γt are the unit and time fixed effect estimates. Lastly, we have the idiosyncratic
error term, εit (Bertrand et al., 2004)
Yit = δi + γt + β ∗Dit + εit (.4)
The DiD equation takes account of both time and individual fixed effects. When unit
and time fixed effects are included, we account for both unit-specific time-invariant and
time-specific unit-invariant unobserved confounders in a flexible way (Imai and Kim, 2020).
From the static TWFE model, we can interpret as the overall effect of participating in
the treatment across groups and time periods.
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Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020) expand on the model above and present a more dynamic
model specification of the DiD model as presented below:






∗βe ∗Deit + vit (.5)
The more dynamic model has a more complex mathematical notation, where at and ag
in this case are the fixed effects, respectively for time, t and group, g. Callaway and
Sant’Anna (2020) describes Deit = 1(1 − Gi = e) as an indicator for a unit, i being e
periods away from the initial treatment time, Gi. Lastly, K and L are positive constants,
while vit is the error term. The general interpretation of βe for e ≥ 0 in the dynamic model
is the measurement of the effect of participating in the treatment at different lengths of
exposure to the treatment.
Based on the dynamic model of Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020), the following model is
identical but with the same notation as in the static model. This makes the model easier
to interpret. Compared to the static model, it also includes the possibility of multiple
treatment periods by including several DiD estimates across time:
Yit = δi + γt +
T∑
t=1,t6=t0
∗βt ∗Dit + εit (.6)
All βt coefficients measure the effect relative to period t0, which indicates the policy
implementation. The inclusion of multiple time periods is beneficial in two ways. First,
if there are multiple time periods before the policy implementation, it allows for partial
testing of the underlying assumptions using pre-trends. Second, if there are multiple time
periods after the policy implementation, it is possible to examine the timing of the effect.
